The Paradox of Myanmar's Regime Change

This book analyzes Myanmar’s contemporary political history, arguing
that Myanmar’s so-called "democratization" has always been a calculated
regime transition, planned by the military, with every intention that
the military to remain the key permanent political actor in Myanmar’s
political regime.
Using the period since Myanmar’s regime change in
2011 as an extended case study, this book offers an original theory of
regime transition. The author argues that Myanmar’s ongoing regime
transition has not diverged from its authoritarian military roots and
explains how the military has long planned its voluntary partial
withdrawal from direct politics. Therefore, Myanmar’s "disciplined
democracy" contains features of democratic politics, but at its core
remains authoritarian. Providing an original contribution to the
theoretical literature on regime change by developing a theory of trial
and error regime transition, the book engages with and challenges the
popular democratization theory by arguing that this theory does not
sufficiently explain hybrid regimes or authoritarian durability.
Additionally, the book adds to an alternative understanding of how the
regime transition was initiated by examining the historical evolution of
Myanmar’s post-colonial regime and offers a fresh perspective on
contemporary political developments in Myanmar.
An important
contribution to the study of authoritarian durability and the dynamics
of regime change in Southeast Asia, this book will be of interest to
academic researchers of comparative politics, international relations,
and Southeast Asian studies.